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THE DIMINISHING ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL 
TREATIES AND DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES (MEDELLIN v. TEXAS) 
by 
J.L. Yranski Nasuti, JD, LLM* 
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states 
that " . .. all Treaties made or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." 1 Whether a treaty has been made under the 
authority of the United States, whether it must be enforced by 
individual states, and whether the president of the United States 
can compel a state court to enforce the decision of an 
international tribunal interpreting a treaty obligation of the 
United States were three issues that the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed in the case of Medellin v. Texas. 2 The Court, in a six 
to three decision, concluded that a foreign national, who had 
been convicted of a capital offense in a state court, could not 
invoke a treaty, a decision of the International Court of Justice, 
and a presidential memorandum to preempt the state 's 
limitations on the defendant's ability to file successive habeas 
corpus petitions. Although the decision involved a criminal 
appeal, it provided the U.S. Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to articulate a new, and narrow, bright line test for 
the interpretation of treaties that is now applicable to all kinds 
of public and private international law disputes. 
*Professor of Legal Studies in Business, lona College, New 
Rochelle, NY 
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I. 
Treaty Law 
The three international treaties at the center of the 
Medellin case are the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (hereinafter "Vienna Convention" or "Convention"),3 
the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes 
(hereinafter "Optional Protocol"),4 and the United Nations 
Charter. 
The Vienna Convention, whose express purpose is to 
"contribute to the development of friendly relations among 
nations,"5 formalizes fairly uniform practices among nations 
regarding consular relations. Article 36 of the Convention 
specifically sets forth the circumstances under which a person, 
who has been detained in a foreign country, may have access to 
a consulate officer of the detainee's home country.6 Article 
36( 1 )(b) provides that the detaining authorities must, at the 
request of the detainee and without delay, notify the consular 
officers of the detention and promptly inform the detainee of 
his or her rights under the treaty. Article 36(2) further states 
that the detainee 's rights should be exercised in conformity 
with the laws and regulations of the arresting county -
provided that the rules and regulations "enable full effect to be 
given to the purposes for which [those] rights ... are intended." 
The United States ratified the Vienna Convention, as an Article 
II treaty, with the unanimous advice and consent of the Senate. 
The treaty became binding on the United States on December 
24, 1969. At the time of the ratification, the representatives of 
the executive branch assured the Senate that the Vienna 
Convention was entirely self-executing and would not require 
any implementing legislation.7 
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The Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which 
was also ratified by the United States, establishes compulsory 
jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) in 
matters involving either the interpretation or application of the 
Vienna Convention.8 It allows a complaining party to file a 
unilateral application with the I.C.J. in those instances where 
both countries are parties to the Convention and to the Optional 
Protocol. The United States was, in fact, the first signatory of 
the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol to institute 
proceedings in the I.C.J. based on violations of the 
Convention.9 
The final treaty at issue in the Medellin case is the 
Charter of the United Nations. Article 94(1) of the Charter 
specifies that a signatory of the Charter "undertakes to comply 
with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any 
case in which it is a party." The Statute of the International 
Court of Justice, 10 which is incorporated into the Charter, 
further states that while a judgment of the LC.J. only "binding 
force ... between parties and in respect of that particular case," 1 1 
it is considered to be final and without the right of appeal. 12 
I.C.J. Case Law 
Within the past ten years, the International Court of 
Justice decided three cases - Case Concerning the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United 
States) , 13 LaGrand Case (The Federal Republic of Germany v. 
United States) ,14 and Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States/ 5 - in which it 
concluded that the United States had violated Art. 36( 1 )(b) of 
the Vienna Convention when it failed to inform the consular 
officers of Paraguay, Germany and Mexico that their national 
had been detained in the United States. 
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In the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention, 
Paraguay alleged that one of its citizens, Angel Francisco 
Breard, had been arrested and convicted of attempted rape and 
capital murder in a Virginia state court without being informed 
of his rights under the Vienna Convention. Breard 
unsuccessfully appealed his case to the Virginia Supreme 
Court16 and was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. 17 
He subsequently filed a motion for habeas corpus in federal 
court - asserting, for the first time, that his Vienna Convention 
rights had been violated. At the same time, the government of 
Paraguay filed its separate claim in the International Court of 
Justice against the United States. The I.C.J. responded by 
issuing a provisional order requesting that the United States 
stay Breard's execution until the I.C.J. could deliver a final 
decision. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Breard 's writ of 
habeas corpus on the grounds that he had procedurally 
defaulted on his Vienna Convention claim when he failed to 
raise that claim in state court and declined to issue an order 
staying the execution. 18 The state of Virginia executed Breard 
without waiting for the I.C.J. to deliver a final judgment. At 
that point, the I.C.J. accepted Paraguay's request to discontinue 
the proceedings with prejudice. 
The detainee's in the LaGrand Case were two German 
national, Karl and Walter LaGrand, who had been convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death by an Arizona state court. The 
German government' s claim before the I.C.J. accused the 
United States of violating the Vienna Convention when it 
failed to inform the brothers of their right to contact a German 
consular officer. The I.C.J. 's judgment, which was delivered 
after the brothers were executed, was entered in favor of 
Germany. The Court held that: l. Article 36 of the 
Convention conferred individual rights on detained foreign 
national; 2. the United States failed to comply with the treaty; 
and 3. the procedural default rules of the United States 
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prevented the rights under the treaty from being given full 
effect. 19 The Court added that the United States, "by means of 
its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of 
the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation 
of the rights set for in that Convention.20 
Mexico brought the Avena case to the I.C.J. on behalf 
of 51 Mexican national who had been detained, tried, and 
convicted of capital crimes in the United States. The I.C.J. 
concluded that the United States had engaged in three 
categories of violations under the Vienna Convention. The 
first was that the United States, and its local authorities, failed 
to inform the Mexican nationals that they had a right to contact 
the Mexican consulate.21 The second was that the United 
States failed to notifY the Mexican consulate that its nationals 
were being detained in the United States.22 The final violation 
related to the inability of the Mexican consuls to provide for 
legal representation for the detainees.23 The I.C.J. held that the 
adequate reparation for these particular violations of Article 36 
would involve the review and reconsideration of the 
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals by the 
United States courts. Although the I.C.J. allowed the United 
States to decide the means for the review and reconsideration, 
it specified that it had to involve a judicial, and not an 
executive clemency, process. 24 
The Presidential Memorandum 
President George W. Bush reacted to the I.C.J.'s Avena 
judgment in two ways. The first was to issue an order 
("President's Memorandum for the Attorney General, Subject: 
Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of 
Justice in A vena")(hereinafter "memorandum") stating Bush's 
intention to ensure that the United States discharge its 
international legal obligations under the Avena decision and 
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asserting his power as president to require state courts to 
comply with the decision of the I.C.J. in accordance with 
general principles ofcomity.25 Bush's second action was to 
instruct the Secretary of State to inform the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations that the United States was invoking its 
rights to withdraw from the Optional Protocol. 
II. 
The Preliminary Medellin Cases 
In 1993, Jose Ernest Medellin, a Mexican national who 
had spent most of his life in the United States, was arrested in 
connection with the gang rape and murder of two Houston 
female teenagers. It was alleged that Medellin, a member of 
the "Black and Whites" gang, had tried to talk to one of the 
young women. When she attempted to run away, he stopped 
her and threw her to the ground. Her friend was then grabbed 
by the other gang members. Both women were repeatedly 
raped over the course of an hour. In the end, the gang 
members murdered the girls and discarded their bodies in a 
wooded area. 
When the Texas police arrested Medellin, they gave 
him his Miranda warnings - but failed to inform him of his 
right, under the Vienna Convention, to ask the government to 
notifY the Mexican consulate of his detention. Within hours of 
his arrest, Medellin had signed a written waiver and given a 
detailed confession. He was eventually tried, convicted of 
capital murder, and sentenced to death. His conviction and 
sentence was affirmed on appeal.26 
Medellin raised the claim that Texas had violated his 
Vienna Convention rights for the first time subsequent 
application for a writ of habeas corpus that was filed in the 
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Texas state court.27 The district court denied his writ on the 
grounds that: 1. he was procedurally barred from a review 
since he had failed to raise the Vienna Convention claim at 
trial; 2. he lacked standing as a private individual to file 
claims based on the Vienna Convention; 3. he had failed to 
show any actual harm since he had received effective legal 
representation and his constitutional rights had been 
safeguarded; and 4. he had not been able to prove that his 
Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated 
or that the failure to notify the Mexican consulate had affected 
the validity of his conviction and sentence. On appeal, the 
Texas Criminal Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's 
decision to deny the writ.28 
Medellin next turned to the federal courts for relief. 
After the U.S. District Court denied his application for a writ of 
habeas corpus that was based on his Vienna Convention 
claim,29 he filed a certificate of appealability. Shortly 
thereafter the I.C.J. rendered its decision in the Avena case. (It 
should be noted that Medellin had been one ofthe 51 detainees 
named in the petition that was filed by Mexico with the I.C.J.). 
Despite the ruling by the I.C.J. that the United States had 
violated the Vienna Convention, that the Convention conferred 
individual rights, and that the convictions of the detainees had 
to be reviewed irregardless of procedural default rules, the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Medellin's 
request of appealability. 30 The Fifth Circuit's decision was 
primarily based on two cases - Breard v. Greene31 and United 
States v. Jimenez-Nava.32 (In Breard, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that procedural default rules would trump claims based on 
violations of the Vienna Convention. In Jimenez-Nava, the 
Fifth Circuit ruled that the Vienna Convention did not create 
individually enforceable rights.)33 Medellin then filed, and was 
granted, a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.34 
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Prior to the date scheduled for oral arguments in the 
U.S. Supreme Court, President Bush issued his memorandum 
instructing state courts to give effect to the A vena decision as a 
matter of comity. This encouraged Medellin to file a second 
state application for a writ of habeas corpus requesting the 
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas to give full effect to both 
the Avena decision and the President's memorandum. 35 At that 
point, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed Medellin's pending 
case as improvidently granted noting the possibility that "Texas 
courts will provide Medellin with the review he seeks pursuant 
to the Avena judgment and the President's memorandum."36 
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed 
Medellin ' s second application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
the grounds that it was an abuse of the writ. 37 It also rejected 
Medellin's two main assertions. The first was that the Avena 
decision the President's memorandum constituted binding 
federal law that would preempt the Texas procedural rule that 
prohibited successive habeas corpus petitions.38 The second 
was that the original decision and memorandum did not 
consider previously unavailable factual and legal bases, which 
under §5(a)( 1 ), would justify an exception to the prohibition 
against successive filing. The denial of the writ was based, in 
part, on the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in the consolidated 
cases of Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and Bustillo v. Johnson.39 
Although the Court, in the Sanchez-Llamas case, skirted the 
issue of whether the Convention granted individual rights that 
could be invoked in a judicial proceeding, it ruled that the 
exclusionary rule was not a remedy for an Article 36 violation 
and that Article 36 claims were subject "to the same procedural 
default rules that apply generally to other federal-law 
claims."40 The Texas appellate court concluded that the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution did not allow the 
I.C.J. 'sA vena decision and the President's memorandum to 
preempt the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Art.ll.701 §5. 
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III. 
Medellin and the U.S. Supreme Court 
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Medellin's 
second request for a writ of certiorari - this time to review the 
state court's denial of Medellin's most recent habeas corpus 
petition.41 The grant of certiorari came after the I.C.J. had 
already held on three separate occasions that the United States 
had violated of its obligations under the Vienna Convention; 
the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected multiple requests by 
convicted foreign detainees to assert Art. 36 rights; President 
Bush had issued his memorandum instructing the state courts 
to comply with the I.C.J. 's Avena decision; and the Texas court 
had refused to follow the decision of the I.C.J. and the 
President's memorandum to grant a writ of habeas corpus to 
review and reconsider the conviction. The Supreme Court' s 6-
3 decision was significant because it established an important 
new bright-line test regarding treaty Jaw at the same time that it 
limited President Bush's vision of presidential power. 
Three opinions were issued in the Medellin case: Chief 
Justice John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, which was 
joined by Justices John Roberts delivered the majority opinion, 
which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito; Justice John 
Paul Stevens presented a separate concurring opinion; and 
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined a 
dissenting opinion that was written by Justice Stephen Breyer. 
Each opinion tacked the constitutional and presidential power 
questions from different perspectives. 
The Majority Decision 
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For the majority, the first issue was not whether the Avena 
decision "constitutes an international law obligation on the part 
of the United States" - but rather "whether the Avena judgment 
has automatic domestic legal effect such that the judgment of 
its own force applies in state and federal courts."42 In order to 
answer this question, the Court employed an interpretative 
approach to differentiate between self-executing treaties (those 
that have automatic domestic effect as federal law upon 
ratification) and non-self-executing treaties (those that only 
become domestically enforceable federal law when 
implementing legislation is passed by Congress) . Under this 
interpretative approach, the Court parsed the actual text of the 
treaty to determine whether Congress had intended the treaty to 
be self-executing. A treaty could only become part of the 
domestic law if Congress enacted implementing statues or "the 
treaty itself convey[ed] an intention that it [was] "self-
executing" and [was] ratified in these terms. "43 Roberts 
viewed the interpretative approach as a way to preserve that 
"Framers established [as] a careful set of procedures that must 
be followed before federal law can be created under the 
Constitution - vesting the decision in the political branches, 
subject to checks and balances.'"'4 
The majority, curiously enough, did not find it 
necessary to determine whether the Vienna Convention was a 
self-executing treaty.45 While the Avena judgment was based 
on a violation of the Vienna Convention and created an 
international law obligation on the United States, the Court 
concluded that it did not necessarily create an obligation that 
was automatically binding on domestic law. According to the 
majority, the only treaties that were relevant to determine if 
Avena had created binding federal law were the Optional 
Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and the I.C.J. Statute. 
201 0/The Diminishing Role/92 
The Court viewed the Optional Protocol as an 
agreement that established a "bare grant of jurisdiction" - and 
not a commitment by its signatories to comply with the 
resulting I.C.J. judgment. When the Senate ratified the 
Optional Protocol, it had not indicated, in its words of adopting 
or in implementing legislation, that an I.C.J. decision involving 
the United States would have immediate legal effect in 
domestic courts.46 The majority concluded that the U.N. 
Charter, and not the Protocol, was the appropriate reference 
point to discover what obligations the United States had with 
regard to the International Court of Justice. Article 94(1) of the 
Charter states that "[e]ach Member of the United Nations 
undertakes to comply with the decisions of the I.C.J. in any 
case to which it is a party." (Emphasis added.) Even here the 
majority thought there was a significant different between 
"undertaking to comply" as opposed to "shall comply" or 
"must comply". For the majority, Article 94(1) was not a 
directive to domestic courts - but rather a "call upon 
governments to take certain action."47 The sole remedy 
available when a member nation refused to comply with an 
I.C.J. decision was a diplomatic rather than a judicial one. 
Article 94(2) (which the majority referred to as "the 
enforcement provision") states that: "If any party to a case 
fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have 
recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems 
necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to 
be taken to give effect to the judgment." Of course, such a 
remedy would most likely be toothless if the noncomplying 
country was the United States - or any other permanent 
member of the Security Council in possession of veto power.48 
The majority noted that this was the outcome that the executive 
branch had originally envisioned, and the one that it had 
conveyed to the Senate, at the time the United States agreed to 
the U.N. Charter and the declaration accepting general 
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compulsory jurisdiction by the I.C.J.49 If the Supreme Court 
allowed Medellin to enforce the Avena decision in a domestic 
court, it would not only eliminate the government's option of 
noncompliance that was available under Article 94(2) but it 
would also "undermin[ e] the ability of the political branches to 
determine whether and how to comply with an I.C.J. 
decision."50 
The majority opinion also pointed to the l.C.J. Statue to 
support its conclusion that a decision of the I.C.J. did not 
automatically become a part of judicially enforceable federal 
laws available to individual petitioners. The language of the 
Statue clearly stated that the I.C.J. 's principal purpose was to 
hear disputes between nations and not individuals51 and that a 
decision of the l.C.J. had "no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case."52 Medellin, as an 
individual, could not claim to have been a party to the Avena 
case (even though Mexico filed its case with the I.C.J. , at least 
in part, because Medellin had been denied access to one of its 
consulate officers at the time of his arrest.) The Avena decision 
was, therefore, binding only between Mexico and the United 
States - but not between Medellin and the United States. 
The Court further cited a "postratification 
understanding" of the signatory countries to the Optional 
Protocol and the Vienna Convention in support of its 
conclusion that A vena did not constitute bending federal law. 
This "postratification understanding" was evidenced by the fact 
that none of the 4 7 signatories to the Optional Protocol and 171 
signatories to the Vienna Convention had treated I.C.J. 
judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of domestic 
law. 53 The fact that the Supreme Court was unable to find any 
other signatory nation that treated an I.C.J. judgment as directly 
enforceable as a matter of domestic law strongly suggested to 
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the Court that the United States had no need to treat the 
judgments any differently.54 
Another interpretation problem for the majority was the 
impact that an I.C.J. decision had on state procedural law. The 
Supreme Court had previously held, in both Sanchez-Llamas 
and Breard, that "absent a clear and express statement to the 
contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the 
implementation of the treaty in that State. "55 The Court 
recognized that since the effect of the automatic enforcement, 
in a state court, of an I.C.J. judgment involving treaty 
obligations might interfere with state procedural rules, that 
domestic effect must clearly have been stated as the intention 
of the body that ratified the treaty. Since this was not done by 
the Senate when it ratified the Optional Protocol, the U.N. 
Charter, or the I.C.J. Statute, it could not be supposed that the 
Senate expected the state procedural rules to be ignored.56 
At the same time that the Court denied Medellin' s right 
to individually enforce the I.C.J. judgment in domestic courts, 
it also attempted to reassure litigants in private international 
law matters that this decision would have no impact on the 
ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or international 
arbitral agreements in domestic courts.57 The Court noted that 
the primary difference between those cases and Medellin was 
that Medellin had asked the Court to enjoin the operation of 
state law and require the state to take action to "review and 
reconside[r]" his case.58 Such a result would be in opposition 
to the general rule that judgments of foreign courts awarding 
injunctive relief(against individuals or sovereign nations) "are 
generally not entitled to enforcement."59 
The majority further concluded that while the LC.J. 
decision created a binding obligation on the part of the United 
States, it did not, by itself, become binding federal law with the 
power to preempt state criminal procedural restrictions on the 
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filing of successive habeas petitions. This was because 
"nothing in the text, background, negotiating and drafting 
history, or proactive among signatory nations suggests that the 
President or Senate intended the improbable result of giving 
the judgments of an international tribunal a higher status than 
that enjoyed by "many of our most fundamental constitutional 
protections. "60 
The final issue that the Court considered was whether 
President Bush's memorandum transformed the Avena 
judgment into the law of the land through the exercise of 
executive power "to establish binding rules of decision that 
preempt contrary state law."61 The majority agreed that "the 
President's constitutional role "uniquely qualifies" him to 
resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions that bear on 
compliance with an l.C.J. decision and "to do so 
expeditiously."62 At the same time, that did not mean that the 
President had the unqualified authority to act as he saw fit. 
Pointing to "first principles," the majority stated that "the 
President's authority to act must stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself."63 To determine 
whether Presidential authority existed in this case, the Court 
relied on the tripartite scheme for evaluating executive action 
that was enunciated in Justice Robert Jackson's concurring 
opinion in the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer.64 
According to Jackson, "[when] a President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, 
his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can 
delegate."65 On the other hand, when "the President acts in 
absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, 
he can only rely upon his independent powers ... [T]here is 
[however] a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
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have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
unccrtain."66 As a result, congressional inertia, indifference, or 
quiescence might enable to invite the President to take on 
independent responsibility.67 Finally, "[ when] the President 
takes measures incompatible with the express or implied will 
of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb" and the Court can 
sustain his action "only by disabling the Congress from acting 
upon the subject."68 
The United States government and Medellin tried to 
convince the Court that President Bush had the authority to 
require states to review and consider the cases of the Mexican 
nationals named in Avena without regard to the states' own 
procedural default rules. The amicus curiae brief, which was 
submitted on behalf of the United States, presented two 
arguments to support its claim that the President's actions fell 
within the category that would give him the maximum 
authority under the Youngstown model. The first was that the 
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter gave the President the 
authority to implement the Avena decision and that Congress 
had acquiesced to the use of that authority. The second was 
that the President's foreign affairs authority provided him with 
" an independent" international dispute-resolution power. A 
third argument, which was proposed by Medellin, suggested 
that the President's memorandum was a valid exercise of his 
constitutional "Take Care" power. The Court rejected each of 
these arguments based on its conclusion that the Optional 
Protocol and the U.N. Charter were non-self-executing treaties. 
The majority found no merit in the government's 
assertion that the treaties gave the President authority to 
implement the I.C.J. decision and that Congress had 
acquiesced. That was because only Congress had the 
responsibility, and authority, to transform any international 
obligations arising under those treaties into domestic law. 69 
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The Court agreed that the President had the authority, under 
Article II, §2 of the U.S. Constitution, to "make a treaty." lf, 
however, that treaty did not contain language plainly providing 
for domestic enforceability, it was non-self-executing and 
could only become domestic law " in the same way as any other 
law - through passage of legislation by both Houses of 
Congress, combined with either the President's signature or a 
congressional override of a Presidential veto."70 Since 
Congress had not passed any legislation to implement either 
the Optional Protocol or the U.N. Charter, it "did not 
"express[ly] or implicit[ly ]" vest the President with the 
unilateral authority to make them self-executing."71 
Consequently, the President had not acted within the first 
category of authority that was described in the Youngstown 
model. On the contrary, the fact that the President had 
attempted to "enforce" a non-self-executing treaty by 
unilaterally creating domestic law placed his actions squarely 
within Jackson's third category ofunauthorized executive 
action. 
The majority also rejected the government' s claim that 
Congress had acquiesced to the President 's actions thereby 
placing them within Jackson's second category of authorized 
actions. The Solicitor General had supported his argument by 
citing a number of instances in which presidents had resolved 
I.C.J. controversies with congressional acquiescence.72 The 
Court differentiated the presidential action in those cases from 
the President's action in the Medellin case by noting that in the 
later that he was "transforming an international obligation into 
domestic law and thereby displacing state law."73 While the 
President had "related" statutory responsibilities and an 
"established role" in litigating foreign policy concerns, that 
statutory role was to represent the United States before the 
U.N., the I.C.J. , and the Security Council, but not to exercise 
unilateral authority to create domestic law.74 
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The Solicitor General had alternatively argued that the 
President's memorandum was binding on the states since it was 
based on the President's foreign affairs authority to resolve 
claim disputes with foreign nations.75 The Court conceded that 
while it had upheld a narrow presidential authority to enter into 
executive agreements intended to settle civil claims between 
U.S. citizens and foreign governments or foreign nationals, that 
authority was not applicable in this case. That was because 
there was no precedent to extend that authority to "a 
Presidential directive issued to state court, much less one that 
reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and 
compel state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set 
aside neutrally applicable state laws."76 
The majority concluded by summarily rejecting the 
argument, submitted by Medellin and not supported by the 
Solicitor General, that the President' s Memorandum was a 
valid exercise of his "Take Care" power. Under Article II, §3 
of the U.S. Constitution, the President has the responsibility to 
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." According to 
the Court, that authority is limited to executing laws - and not 
to making laws; Since the Avena judgment was not a domestic 
law, it could not be executed by the President.77 
The Concurring Opinion 
Justice John Paul Stevens voted with the majority- but 
did not sign on to the majority opinion. His main objection to 
the majority' s legal rational stemmed from his conclusion that 
the text and history of the Supremacy Clause and the Court's 
precedents in earlier treaty cases did not support a presumption 
against self-execution. 78 That having been stated, Stevens 
devoted the rest of his concurring opinion to a discussion of 
whether the U.N. Charter and he Statute of the International 
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Court of Justice authorized the Court to enforce the I.C.J. 
decision in the A vena case. 
According to Stevens, whatever obligation the United 
States had to comply with the Avena judgment was found in 
Article 94( I) of the U.N. Charter. The provision that a member 
ofthe U.N. "undertakes to comply [emphasis added] with the 
decision of the [I.C.J] in any case to which it is a party" was 
not seen as a model for either a self-executing commitment or 
non-self-executing commitment. Instead, it was "most 
naturally read as a to take additional steps to enforce 
I.C.J. judgments." 7 Some treaties, such as the U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 80 have specifically provided 
for the incorporation of international judgments into domestic 
law. In others, Congress has had to pass implementing statutes 
to provide for the same result - even then the treaties 
themselves had included language far more mandatory than 
"undertakes to comply." The wording of Article 94( l) was not 
so unambiguous that it foreclosed the possibility of self-
execution nor had the Senate issued a declaration of non-self-
execution when it ratified the Charter. On the other hand, 
without a presumption in favor of self-execution or non-self-
execution, Stevens preferred reading the phrase "undertakes to 
comply" as "contempt[ ating] future action by the political 
branches."81 This left decisions about whether to comply (and 
to what extent) with a particular I.C.J. judgment to the political, 
and not the judicial, branch of government. 
Although Stevens applauded the President's 
memorandum as "a commendable attempt" to induce state 
governments to discharge the United States' international 
obligation, he still did not think it created binding law. 
Nonetheless, that did to stop him from urging Texas to 
"undertake to comply" with the Avena decision. Since it was 
Texas' failure to inform Medellin of his rights under the 
Convention that contributed to the United States having to 
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submit to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J., it was appropriate, in 
this case, for Texas to "shoulder the primary responsibility for 
protecting the honor and integrity of the Nation."82 
Stevens concluded his concurring opinion with a 
practical evaluation of why the I.C.J. 's decision should not be 
ignored - the cost to Texas in complying with the A vena would 
be minimal. It was likely that the violation of the Vienna 
Convention actually prejudiced Medellin. On the other hand, 
the costs of refusing to comply were significant. Such a breach 
would endanger the nation 's compelling interests in "ensuring 
the reciprocal observation of the Vienna Convention, 
protecting relations with the foreign governments, and 
demonstrating commitment to the role of internationallaw."83 
The Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Stephen Breyer' s dissenting opinion was highly 
critical of the majority's rigid formula for determining whether 
a treaty was self-executing or non-self-executing. To the 
question of whether the Supremacy Clause required Texas to 
follow the I.C.J. judgment in the Avena case, the minority 
opinion answered in the affirmative based on its belief that the 
majority ignored precedents that established a different view of 
treaties under the Supremacy Clause. 
Breyer began by considering the intentions of the 
Founding Fathers when they wrote, in the Supremacy Clause, 
that "all Treaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." The 
early case of Ware v. Hylton84 addressed the role of treaties in 
U.S. jurisprudence. In that instance, the U.S. Supreme Court 
had to decide whether a provision of the 1783 Paris Peace 
Treaty between the British and the United States had 
effectively nullified an earlier, and contradictory, state law -
even though Congress had never enacted legislation to enforce 
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that particular treaty provision. The justices, who were 
unanimous in their conclusion that the state law was no longer 
valid, submitted separate opinions to explain their different 
legal rationales. Justice James Iredell 's decision was 
particularly noteworthy, at least in part, because he had been a 
member ofNorth Carolina's Ratifying Convention and because 
his legal reasoning was subsequently relied on by Justice 
Joseph Story, in his classic legal treatise on the Constitution,85 
to explain the intention of the Founders in drafting the 
Supremacy Clause. 
Iredell noted that the terms of the Paris Peace Treaty 
could have been characterized as "executed" or "executory" -
the former taking effect automatically upon ratification and 
later taking effect only when they are "carried into execution" 
by the signatory nation "in the manner which the Constitution 
of the nation prescribe[d]." 86 Prior to the adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution, in both the United States and Britain, the 
executory provisions only become part of domestic law if 
Congress (in the United States) or Parliament (in Britain) had 
written them into their domestic law. The adoption of the U.S. 
Constitution, however, eliminated the need for Congress to 
pass further legislation in order to enforce executory provisions 
such as the debt-collection provision that was at issue in the 
Ware case. That was because "under this Constitution, so far 
as a treaty constitutionally is binding, upon principles of moral 
obligation, it is also by the vigor of its own authority to be 
executed in fact. It would not otherwise be the Supreme law in 
the new sense provided for."87 Other provisions of the Paris 
Peace Treaty that automatically bound the United States 
without further congressional action included those requiring 
the release of prisoners and those forbidding war-related 
"future confiscations."88 
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An examination of case law demonstrated that self-
executing treaty provisions were not uncommon in the United 
States and that the Supremacy Clause (which handled the self-
execution issue differently from the approach taken by many 
other countries) applied many, but not all, treaty provisions 
directly to the states. In Foster v. Neilson,89 Chief Justice John 
Marshall held that in the United States, under the Supremacy 
Clause, a treaty was "the law of the land ... to be regarded in 
Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature" and 
"operate[ d] of itself without the aid of any legislative 
provision."90 The only exception that Marshall could find this 
rule was if the treaty had specifically contemplated execution 
through legislation and, consequently, "addresse[ d] itself to the 
political, not the judicial department."91 By 1840, Justice 
Henry Baldwin had submitted a concurring opinion, in Lessee 
of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, in which he stated that ' it would be 
a bold proposition: to claim "that an act of Congress must be 
first passed" for a treaty to become "a supreme law of the 
land. "92 In his review of Supreme Court precedents, Breyer 
was able to cite 29 cases (including 12 invalidating state or 
territorial law or policy) in which the Court had either held or 
assumed that particular treaty provisions were self-executing 
and automatically binding on the States.93 On the other hand, 
he could not find two case in which the Court had taken the 
opposing view and held that specific congressional actions had 
indicated that Congress had thought that further legislation was 
necessary. 94 
Roberts ' majority opinion created a presumption that 
the treaty obligations were non-self-executing unless the treaty 
contained specific language indicating otherwise. According to 
Breyer, that was "misguided" since it contradicted the many 
instances in which the Court had upheld treaty provisions as 
self-executing even though they contained no such textual 
language. His dissenting opinion also pointed to the majority's 
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failure to appreciate the significance of the fact that it was a 
signatory nation's domestic law that determined whether 
additional legislative action was necessary in order for a treaty 
provision to have domestic effect. The failure to include self-
execution language in a treaty might simply have reflected the 
drafters' awareness that not all nations require imf:lementing 
legislation before a treaty becomes domestic law. 5 Breyer was 
convinced that the presence or absence of"self-execution" 
language in a treaty proved nothing and was an example of the 
Court "hunting the snark."96 For the minority, the unfortunate 
consequence of the majority's decision was that it "erect[ ed] 
legalistic hurdles that can threaten the application of provisions 
in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it 
more difficult to negotiate new ones.97 
Up until Medellin, the Court had relied on, what Breyer 
characterized as, practical, context-specific criteria" to decide 
if the provisions of a treaty were self-executing.98 That 
approach required the Court to look to the text and history of a 
treaty as well as its subject matter and related characteristics to 
determine, as Chief Justice Marshall had suggested in Ware, 
whether a particular treaty provision addressed itself to the 
political departments for further action or to the judicial 
department for direct enforcement. Matters relating to peace or 
war should be the province of political departments - while 
matters relating to traditional private legal rights (property, 
business, or civil tort recovery) should be directed to the 
judicial department. In addition, if a treaty provision conferred 
specific and readily enforceable individual legal rights, it 
should also be a matter for the judiciary. While Breyer 
conceded that the Court in the past had "not create[ d] a simple 
test, let alone a magic formula," it had developed a practical, 
context-specific judicial approach that sought to separate the 
more run-of-the-mill judicial matters from the more politically 
charged ones. 99 
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When Breyer applied the practical, context-specific 
criteria to the relevant treaty provisions at issue in the 
Medellin, case, he concluded that the provisions were self-
executing. His conclusion was based on seven factors: 1. The 
language of treaties strongly supported direct judicial 
enforcement; 100 2. The Optional Protocol had been applied to 
a dispute arising under a provision of the Vienna Convention, 
which was itself self-executing and judicially enforceable; 101 
3. It would not be logical to make a self-executing promise 
under the Vienna Convention, to promise to accept as final an 
I.C.J. judgment interpreting that self-executing promise, and 
then to insist that that judgment was not self-executing; 102 4. 
A presumption against self-execution would have "serious 
negative practical implications" (especially for seventy other 
treaties that include I.C.J. dispute provisions similar to those 
found in the Optional Protocol); 10 5. The judgment in the 
I.C.J. case was well suited to direct judicial enforcement since 
it only called for the "review and reconsideration" of any 
"possible prejudice" to the detainees; 104 6. A finding that the 
United State' obligations under the treaty are self-executing as 
applied to the I.C.J. judgment does not threaten constitutional 
conflict with the other branches of government, does not 
require the Court to engage in nonjudicial activity, and does 
not create a new cause ofaction; 105 and 7. Neither the 
President nor Congress had objected to the direct enforcement 
of the I.C.J. decision.106 
Breyer criticized the majority for "look[ing] for the 
wrong thing (explicit textual expression about self-execution) 
using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the 
I ) ,Jo7 A h . . ' ,. treaty anguage . sa consequence, t e maJority s ru mg 
has the potential of depriving individuals (including businesses, 
property owners, testamentary beneficiaries, and consular 
officers) of similar dispute resolution procedures that have 
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been provided for in many treaties. In a world in which 
commerce, trade, and travel have become ever more 
international, this would be the wrong approach. 
After briefly considering what the Court should have 
done if it had decided that the l.C.J. judgment was 
enforceable,108 Breyer turned to the majority's holding that the 
President did not have the constitutional authority to enforce 
the I.C.J. decision in state courts. According to the minority, 
the President had the constitutional authority to act in the area 
of foreign affairs. Consequently, when that power was 
exercised in this case, it fell "within the middle range of 
Presidential authority where Congress has neither specifically 
authorized nor specifically forbidden the Presidential action in 
question." 109 Whether that allowed the President to implement 
the treaty provisions that bound the United States to an I.C.J. 
judgment with regard to the A vena parties and to require the 
setting aside of state procedural law was an issue that the 
. . . d b h I d JJ o mmonty ra1se - ut c ose to eave unanswere . 
Breyer concluded by elaborating on some of the serious 
consequence of the majority's holdings. The first was that it 
"unnecessarily complicate[ d] the President's foreign affairs 
task" 111 by increasing the possibility that the Avena case would 
be taken to the Security Council, by worsening the United 
States' relationship with Mexico, by increasing the risks to 
Americans who are arrested while traveling abroad, and by 
diminishing the reputation of the United States for failing to 
follow the very "rule of law" principles that it has advocated. 
The second was that it "encumbered Congress with a task 
(postratification legislation) that, in respect of many decisions 
of international tribunals, it may not want and which it may 
find difficult to execute."112 Finally, it weaken[ed] the rule of 
law for which the Constitution stands since it ma[de] it more 
difficult to enforce judgments of international tribunals. 113 
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The Final Resolution 
The State of Texas executed Jose Medellin on August 
5, 2008. Medellin had filed a request for a stay of execution 
with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition was based on the 
possibility that Congress or the Texas state legislature "might 
determine that actions of the International Court .. should be 
given controlling weight in determining that a violation of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations is grounds for 
vacating the sentence imposed in this suit."114 The Court's per 
curium decision, which was supported by five of the justices, 
denied Medellin's request based on its conclusion that the 
likelihood of any legislative action occurring was much too 
remote to justify a stay. The majority further noted that th only 
legislative and executive steps that had been taken in the four 
years since the I.C.J. ruling and in the four months since the 
Supreme Court's last ruling were the introduction of a 
Congressional bill to implement the obligations under the 
treaty 115 and the withdrawal of the United States' accession to 
the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. in matters relating to the Vienna 
Convention. The Court also found it significant that the U.S. 
Department of Justice has not sought to intervene in the 
matter. 116 
The four dissenting justices submitted separate opinions 
- each favoring the granting of the stay until there could be 
input by the Solicitor General. Justice Stevens reiterated his 
previous conclusion that neither the President nor the I.C.J. 
could require Texas to determine whether it had prejudiced 
Medellin when it violated the Vienna Convention. 
Nonetheless, he concluded that the fact that Texas had not 
exerted its authority (and duty under international law) to 
remedy the "potentially significant breach of the United States' 
treaty obligations" justified a request for the Solicitor General's 
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view on this matter of serious national security and foreign 
policy. 11 7 Justice Souter pointed to the bill pending in 
Congress and the government's representation to the I.C.J. that 
it would take further steps to enforce the Avena judgment as 
sufficient justification to grant the stay of execution and to hear 
the views of the Solicitor General. 118 Justice Ginsburg also 
supported granting Medellin's petition in order to seek the 
Solicitor General's clarification of a representation that the 
United States had made to the I.C.J. in response to Mexico ' s 
request for provisional measure in the Avena case. 119 Finally, 
Justice Breyer cited six reasons for granting the stay. In 
addition to pointing out that Mexico had returned to the I.C.J. 
seeking U.S. compliance with its international obligations and 
that legislation had been introduced in Congress to "provide 
the legislative approval necessary to transform [the United 
States'] international legal obligations into binding domestic 
law,"120 Breyer also argued that Congress, prior to the Court's 
decision in Medellin, may have assumed that the relevant 
treaties were self-executing and did not require implementing 
legislation, that proceeding with the execution would constitute 
an irremediable violation of international law, that the views of 
the Executive were pertinent to this matter of foreign affairs, 
and that the Court had incorrectly focused on the narrow issue 
of whether the original confession of Medellin was unlawfully 
obtained rather than the more important issue of whether the 
United States would carry out its international obligation to 
enforce the decision of the I.C.J. 121 
IV. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the Medellin case was a 
setback to the international law community and to the Bush 
administration. While Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion 
attempted to create certitude in one area of treaty interpretation 
(by establishing the presumption that treaties are non-self-
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executing unless they contain explicit language of intent), it 
failed to address the practical consequences of that decision. A 
wide variety of treaties (which lack the explicit language but 
which, nevertheless, had been thought to be self-executing) 
will need to be reviewed to see if implementing legislation is 
necessary. The treaty partners of the United States will have 
new grounds for wondering if the United States is really 
committed to honoring its international obligations. U.S. 
citizens who travel abroad for business or pleasure should be 
justifiably concerned that they might not continue to rely on the 
reciprocal protection of the Vienna Convention - especially in 
those countries with national who have been denied the same 
protections in the United States. The decision also place limits 
on the President's view of his power in matters of foreign 
policy. The executive branch's attempts to unilaterally trump 
the objections of the state court in this matter offended the 
Court's understanding of the role of separation of powers and 
federalism. It was somewhat ironic that President Bush, who 
had often appeared indifferent, if not hostile, to international 
law issues, found his power restricted by the Court in the one 
instance where he had directed state courts to "give effect" to a 
decision of the I.C.J.. As a result of its decision in Medellin, 
the Court appears to have concluded that the United States 
continues to have international law obligations - but not a 
commitment - to comply with the I.C.J. 's ruling in Avena. 
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